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Accumulation of Large Foreign Reserves in China: 
A behavioural perspective  
 
Abstract 
The massive accumulation of foreign reserves by China has challenged the conventional thinking 
about prudent reserve management. This paper develops a behavioural model of optimal decision 
making under uncertainty to explain the observed Chinese reserve policy. Departing from the 
conventional approach to utility maximisation based on the agent’s rationality, this paper 
explicitly models the behaviour of Chinese central banker who is influenced by loss aversion and 
narrow framing. Embedding the cognitive biases into the precautionary savings approach to 
holding reserves, the paper shows the behavioural optimality of Chinese reserve build-up and 
provides a plausible explanation of the dynamics of reserve accumulation in China, hence help 
make sense of the puzzling Chinese reserve policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The accumulation of ever larger foreign reserves by many emerging economies, particularly 
China, has fundamentally challenged the traditional thinking about sound reserve management. 
Prior studies have generally articulated a reserve management framework centring on some 
benchmarks for the appropriate reserve level for a country to hold. Where the reserves are below 
or above the metrics of the benchmarks, or even a single point of reference, this is commonly 
considered unhealthy for the economy in question and policy actions are then called for.  While 
in the immediate post-war period it was common for developing economies to suffer from 
reserve inadequacy, nowadays they tend to hold reserves in excess of the benchmark level. In the 
case of China, at the end of 2011 the country had accumulated reserves of USD 3181 billion, 
accounting for 44% of its GDP at the official exchange rate and enough to cover 22 months of 
imports. This level of reserves far exceeds almost all established criteria for optimal reserves for 
any country. Yet, the extraordinary reserve build-up is still ongoing in China. Given the fact that 
excess reserve holdings can incur significant cost, the Chinese reserve policy in recent decades is 
puzzling. The question then arises: Why is this seemingly irrational stockpiling of reserves 
tolerated, or even encouraged?  
 
Conventional reserve literature has failed to offer a satisfactory answer to this question.  While 
central banks hold reserves for multiple purposes (Roger, 1993), early studies assume that 
official reserves chiefly serve to fulfil external obligations (Triffin, 1946).  Heller (1966) argues 
that it is not the transaction motive but rather the precautionary motive that is the main driving 
force for holding reserves. Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) suggest that central banks hold reserves 
as a buffer stock to smooth fluctuations of international payments. These approaches have put 
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forward some benchmarks for optimal reserves based on their respective theoretical 
underpinning, with varying degrees of success historically. But all of them now fail to explain 
satisfactorily why, in reality, central banks in recent decades have deviated, often hugely, from 
the optimal benchmarks (Beck and Weber, 2011). 
 
Many recent studies have attempted either to empirically test or to theoretically explore the 
motives behind high demand for reserves in the emerging markets (Aizenman and Marion, 2003; 
Wijnholds and Sondergaard, 2007; Jeanne and Rancière, 2011; Park and Estrada, 2009; Tereanu, 
2010; Carroll and Jeanne, 2009; Kim, Shirono, and Dabla-Norris, 2011; Sandri, 2011). Unlike 
previous studies that focus on achieving a balance between the cost and benefit of holding 
reserves, the recent literature has turned its attention to the welfare implications of reserve 
accumulation and to offering an analytical framework based on utility maximisation by rational 
agents.  
 
One prominent venture in this approach is the development of the precautionary saving model of 
optimal foreign reserves. The earlier work may be found in Ghosh and Ostry (1997), while 
recent examples include works by Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2009), Jeanne and Rancière, 
(2011), Carroll and Jeanne (2009), and Sandri (2011). This strand of literature has achieved 
important advances over previous models. However, like other models using the rationality-
based analysis of expected utility, this family of models becomes problematic when applied to 
the massive accumulation of foreign reserves by emerging countries, particularly China. It 
remains hard to understand why countries like China would stockpile such a large amount of 
foreign reserves, which is in stark disagreement with the policy advice offered by this approach. 
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In all, existing studies have not been very successful in explaining the behaviour of persistent 
hoarding of reserves in the emerging world. 
 
Motivated by solving the puzzle of China’s massive hoarding of foreign reserves, which is  
seemingly unreasonable from the perspective of conventional economics, this paper seeks to 
develop an alternative model to current thinking, based on the behavioural approach to optimal 
decision making under uncertainty as proposed by, among others, Barberis, Huang and Santos 
(2001). This behavioural model has offered a distinct alternative to rationality-based models for 
understanding the behaviour of financial markets and policy. In this study, we extend the model 
to investigate what drives the massive build-up of foreign reserves in China, and the 
determination of optimal foreign reserves in the context in which decision makers are influenced 
by cognitive biases.  
 
An analytical model in a behavioural perspective is set up to decode the puzzling development of 
Chinese reserve stockpiling. Centring on the agent who is cognitively biased when making 
decisions under uncertainty, the theoretical model embeds the influences of both loss aversion 
and narrow framing, along with precautionary saving as the main motive for accumulating 
seemingly large reserves. Then, numerical solution is derived using the Method of Endogenous 
Grid-points as in Carroll (2006). Benchmark calibration of the model indicates that the 
precautionary saving motive for foreign reserves becomes much stronger when the agent is loss 
averse and has the trait of narrow framing. In all possible scenarios under examination, the level 
of precautionary reserves is higher for the agent with cognitive biases than for the one without. 
This is also true for the level of optimal precautionary reserves derived from the model. 
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According to our model, China’s actual holdings of foreign reserves are broadly in line with that 
predicted by the behavioural model. The results highlight China’s prudent stance in its foreign 
reserve policy and complements the current reserve literature by offering a behavioural 
explanation.   
  
We begin, in Section 2, by reviewing the literature on the motives for reserve accumulation and 
on the cognitive traits that are commonly found to influence decision making of agents when 
faced with uncertainty, i.e. loss aversion and narrow framing. In Section 3, after laying down the 
background of income uncertainty in the Chinese economy and specifying model assumptions, 
we build a behavioural model incorporating loss aversion and narrow framing. The numerical 
solution of the model is presented in Section 4, along with the benchmark calibration results and 
sensitivity tests for the optimal foreign reserves for the agents under the influence of behavioural 
biases. We draw conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1. Conventional Thinking on Optimal Reserves  
2.1.1. Earlier views 
In the context of severe dollar shortage in the period immediately after World War II, Triffin 
(1946) views foreign reserves as a means of meeting the obligation of external payments, and 
establishes some benchmarks with regard to a ratio of reserves to imports for judging whether a 
country has the minimum capability for meeting the obligation. Heller (1966), in the earliest 
study of the precautionary motive, argues that it is the precautionary purpose, rather than 
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transaction purpose, that mainly drives the demand for accumulating foreign reserves. However, 
the emphasis of his work is on establishing a framework for cost-benefit analytics. 
 
Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) suggest that optimal reserves are one that can balance the 
macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves, with the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves. Assuming a transaction motive, they predict that average reserves hinge 
negatively upon adjustment cost, the opportunity cost of reserves and exchange rate flexibility, 
and positively upon GDP and reserve volatility. 
 
2.1.2. The mercantilism motive 
In their explanation of the mercantilism motive, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) 
state that reserve accumulation can be understood as the direct consequence of export-oriented 
policies implemented by most East Asian countries, particularly China, in order to achieve their 
aims of creating more jobs and maintaining economic growth through promoting exports. 
However, Aizenman and Lee (2007) compare the importance of the precautionary motive, i.e. 
self-insurance against the risk caused by sudden stops, with that of the mercantilism motive, and 
find that variables related to the precautionary motive are both statistically and economically 
significant in interpreting reserve accumulation, whereas variables related to the mercantilism 
motive are statistically significant, but not economically significant, which implies the 
dominance of the precautionary motive in emerging economies’ reserve demand. For the case of 
China, Aizenman and Lee (2008) suggest that China’s massive hoarding of reserves takes place 
under a hybrid of the mercantilism and the precautionary motives. 
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2.1.3. The precautionary motive 
Based on the observation that deeper financial integration has increased developing countries’ 
exposure to short-term capital inflows that are subject to sudden stops and reversals (Edwards, 
2004), many recent studies on optimal reserves suggest that reserves can be viewed as self-
insurance to mitigate and prevent an undesired output drop or the crisis caused by sudden stops 
or negative shocks to the economy. This is the precautionary motive. 
 
After Heller (1966), who first points out that the precautionary motive is a dominant influence in 
monetary authorities’ decision to hold international reserves, Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) 
generate a precautionary model in which reserves can be used by a borrowing country challenged 
by default on the external debt. Aizenman and Marion (2003) suggest that following the Asian 
financial crisis, countries in East Asia began to accumulate massive reserves under the 
precautionary motive. Aizenman and Lee (2007) show that the reserve accumulation by 
emerging countries is related to variables that reflect the precautionary motive, and that China is 
not an obvious outlier. Mendoza’s (2010) empirical study suggests that China’s reserve holding 
pattern is driven by the precautionary motive, which is in accordance with other developing 
countries. Using a more elaborated model, Garcia and Soto (2006) conclude that self-insurance 
against sudden stops plays an important role in accounting for recent hoarding of international 
reserves.  
 
Recent studies on optimal reserves interpret the precautionary motive of emerging countries 
using the consumption-based approach. For example, extending the model by Jeanne (2007), 
Jeanne and Rancière (2011) quantify the optimal level of reserves from the perspective of 
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consumption smoothing against output drop caused by capital flow volatility. Likewise, Durdu et 
al. (2009) concentrate on potential sudden stops as a determinant of precautionary foreign asset 
demand. Carroll and Jeanne (2009) derive a tractable model of the net foreign assets in a small 
open economy to estimate the optimal level of precautionary wealth against an idiosyncratic risk. 
 
The dynamics of reserve accumulation studied by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) is 
from a further aspect of macroprudence, which is based on financial stability and financial 
openness in globalised financial integration. In their model, a central bank needs to accumulate 
reserves to take the responsibility of lender of last resort and therefore prevent its economy from 
double drains, i.e. both internal drains (runs from bank deposits to currency) and external drains 
(flight to foreign currency or banks). Hur and Kondo (2011) develop a small open economy 
model in which large reserve holdings by emerging economies are an optimal response to an 
increase in foreign debt rollover risk and therefore can prevent the economies suffering from 
sudden stops. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2012) present a statistical model in which 
optimal reserves can be viewed as the trade-off between the expected cost of sudden stops and 
the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Their conclusion indicates that reserves can reduce the 
probability of sudden stop and its attendant costs. 
 
2.2. Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing 
As application of psychology to agents’ financial decision making, behavioural finance studies 
agents’ response to financial anomalies (Shefrin, 2009). One critical aspect of this branch of 
financial study is the agent’s preference, in which loss aversion and narrow framing are two main 
behavioural elements. 
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Loss aversion is a central proposition of the Prospect Theory (PT) pioneered by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). They propose a value function that is defined over changes in wealth rather than 
final asset position as in conventional economics. The agents view outcomes either as gains or 
losses relative to a certain reference point and are more sensitive to losses than to completely 
commensurate gains; i.e. more weight is assigned to losses than to equally sized gains. 
  
Loss aversion has been well incorporated into finance research. In its effort to provide a new 
avenue for a better understanding of financial anomalies, the behavioural approach to finance has 
made important advances one of which concerns the anomaly caused by the disposition effect 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985), which is closely related to loss aversion. Shefrin and Statman (1985) 
show that, under the influence of such an effect, investors tend to sell stocks that have gained 
value (winners) and to hold on to stocks that have lost value (losers), relative to the stock’s 
purchase price or the reference point. Odean (1998) further shows that investors will sell winners 
soon and hold losers long. 
 
Some variants of loss aversion have also been applied to explain reserves accumulation 
(Aizenman, 1998). This is done mainly through the application of Gul’s (1991) disappointment 
aversion. With this effect, Aizenman shows that a stabilisation fund becomes larger than that 
under expected utility. Aizenman and Marion (2003) further incorporate loss aversion into an 
inter-temporal consumption model to examine large reserve holdings by Asian emerging markets. 
 
The second important factor influencing individuals’ decision-making behaviours is narrow 
framing, first labelled by Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), whereby they assess a specific risk 
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under a narrow, rather than a broad frame. As suggested by Barberis and Huang (2007), narrow 
framing indicates that people assess a specific risk in isolation, separately from their other risks. 
In other words, people act as if they derive utility directly from the outcome of that specific risk, 
even if the specific risk is just one of many determining their overall wealth risk. 
 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) offer a corresponding interpretation for the organisational level. 
They suggest that for a decision maker facing a series of decisions, whether or not to use a broad 
frame depends on how her performance will be evaluated and on the frequency of performance. 
If her performance is assessed narrowly (e.g. when facing a risk, if her performance is estimated 
on that risk alone), the decision maker frames decisions narrowly. Thus, in the context of the 
Chinese central bank, it is reasonable for her to assess the risk of GDP growth narrowly, due to 
the fact that promoting GDP growth is her primary task and her performance is evaluated based 
on GDP growth.    
 
The effect works only when narrow framing and loss aversion are combined. Since loss aversion 
only matters for decisions which trigger gains or losses, it would have little impact on decision 
making where individuals evaluate the specific risk under a broad frame (Read, Loewenstein and 
Rabin, 1999). Benartzi and Thaler (1995) attribute the equity premium puzzle to myopic loss 
aversion, which is the combination of narrow framing and loss aversion. Barberis, Huang and 
Santos (2001) develop a model that incorporates behavioural factors, prominently loss aversion 
and narrow framing, into the optimal decision-making process. In explaining the equity premium, 
they show that investors get utility from consumption while facing volatilities in the value of 
their financial wealth. Loss aversion over these volatilities and narrow framing of risks only in 
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the stock market may help explain the existence of equity premium. Barberis and Huang (2009) 
further refine the behavioural model of optimal choice uncertainty.  
 
Conventional theories of optimal level and growth of foreign reserves have met increasing 
challenges in recent years. Relying on the approach in which rational agent maximises expected 
utility, to derive optimal reserves has proved unsuccessful in shedding light on the huge reserve 
hoardings in the emerging world, particularly in China. Against this backdrop, incorporating 
behavioural factors such as loss aversion and narrow framing may prove to be a promising 
avenue for a better understanding of the rapid accumulation of reserves in China.  
 
3. The Model 
To understand China’s reserve accumulation behaviour, we first characterise the Chinese growth 
strategy and the uncertainties surrounding the economic transformation. This sets out the 
background for delineating assumptions of our model. We then develop a behavioural model of 
optimal decision making under uncertainty to derive the optimal reserves to explain the Chinese 
reserve hoarding. Based on Barberis, Huang and Santos (BHS) (2001), this model departs 
drastically from the conventional consumption-based approach. In what follows, we specify: (A) 
the approach of BHS (2001); (B) the representative agent’s preference informing the 
maximisation problem; (C) the nature of process generating the resources available to the 
representative agent, and (D) behavioural factors including loss aversion and narrow framing. In 
the process, we derive the Euler equations and interpret the precautionary savings motive. 
 
3.1. Model Setup: Background Considerations 
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3.1.1. The Chinese growth strategy 
In December 1978, China launched its first programme of economic reforms, featuring a bold 
move to establish a market economy, and the focal point of its economic policy started to shift 
towards promoting economic growth. Since then, the reforms have achieved remarkable progress 
and maximising growth has been firmly established as China’s overwhelming policy goal. In this 
environment, growth has become the main criterion for measuring policy performance. It is then 
conceivable that the Chinese policymakers would assess the effects of any uncertainty mainly 
with regard to GDP growth, and isolate such effects from those on consumption or total wealth. 
Consequently, along with consumption, maximising GDP growth can and should be incorporated 
into the preference of Chinese policymakers. 
 
3.1.2. Uncertainties facing the Chinese economy 
The past three decades have witnessed remarkable growth in China. Meanwhile, the country has 
rapidly accumulated massive reserves, particularly since its WTO accession in 2001. However, 
the Chinese strategy of focusing chiefly on economic growth has given rise to imbalances 
between the decisive move to a market economy and other supportive measures that would 
enable the establishment of the market institutions. Consequently, Chinese consumers are faced 
with formidable uncertainties surrounding the future path of welfare and living standards. Both 
the fast GDP growth and reserve accumulation are shown in the following Figures. 
 
<Figures 1, 2, about here> 
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Other crucial reforms, such as those regarding the financial sector and pension schemes, have 
clearly lagged behind. For example, due to the incompleteness of its financial reform, the 
Chinese banking system suffers from fragility and the severe problem of non-performing loans. 
Aizenman and Lee (2008) show that financial fragility in China is largely the outcome of 
favourable financing provided to the state-owned enterprises (SOE) and to other targeted 
borrowers. They indicate that non-performing loans (NPLs) were about 23 per cent of GDP on 
average for 2002-03. Prasad and Wei (2005) also indicate that the underdeveloped Chinese 
banking system is vulnerable to external shocks because of the reported NPLs problem and the 
need for a bailout of the banking system. Prasad (2009) suggests that ‘loss of confidence in the 
banking system’ is potentially one of the most serious risks facing the Chinese economy. In 
addition, the underdevelopment of the financial market means that not only workers but also 
producers in China are exposed to borrowing constraints (Wen, 2009; Wen, 2011; Song et al., 
2011). The current pension reform in China generates a negative shock to the completeness of 
individuals’ insurance policies. Chamon et al. (2010) show that China’s high household savings 
are a result of rising income uncertainty and pension reforms. According to them, the permanent 
uncertainty of household income is stable, while the transitory uncertainty rises sharply. 
 
Furthermore, an economic development strategy that places most weight on the construction of 
infrastructure has given rise to imbalances in the economic structure itself. Whereas private 
consumption in China has been squeezed by the inadequate social security coverage, investment 
has been an overwhelming contributor to growth (Prasad, 2009). In Figure 3, the filled line 
shows the total amount of private consumption during the last decade, indicating that private 
consumption is not dominant as a contribution to GDP growth shown by the upper line. Because 
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of the weak private consumption, the Chinese economy is heavily dependent on external demand 
and so is very vulnerable to external shocks. 
<Figure 3 about here> 
Such imbalances have made the Chinese economy vulnerable to uninsurable aggregate risks, 
both internally, through problems such as financial fragility, non-performing loans, and 
inadequate social security coverage, and externally, through collapse of external demand and 
shocks of global financial crisis (Prasad, 2009). This means that Chinese policy makers have to 
take into consideration the possibility of a great downside risk of social and political instability 
and the consequences thereof, as part of its economic decision process.  
 
3.1.3. GDP growth and foreign reserves 
Foreign reserves accumulated by the Chinese central bank can be seen not only as a means of 
production smoothing, but also as a precautionary defence mechanism, a cushion against the 
adverse effects on growth when China is hit by negative shocks. 
 
Reserve accumulation can exercise the function of production smoothing for China. Due to 
inadequacy of the social security provision, the future for Chinese consumers carries great 
uncertainty. In the meantime, however, financial markets in China are incomplete in that no 
contingent financial instruments are available to cover such risk. The Chinese accumulation of 
colossal foreign reserves at the national level can be viewed as a precaution by the authority to 
guard against possible dire consequences of such uninsured risk.  The massive amount of 
reserves serves to smooth growth fluctuations and hence cushion against the income risk. 
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In short, the ongoing economic transformation has brought high uncertainty to Chinese 
consumers. The incompleteness of the financial markets in China means that agents in the 
Chinese economy lack the instruments to insure against future risks. In this setting, the central 
bank accumulates foreign reserves as an Arrow-Debru security or a state contingent claim with a 
view to smoothing consumption on behalf of the whole society. Thus, reserve accumulation by 
China can be taken as a precautionary measure that serves to provide self-insurance against 
income risk and to achieve risk sharing within China and across countries.  
 
3.2. Assumptions 
For simplicity, we consider a world that consists of two countries: a home country and a foreign 
country representing the rest of the world. Let the home country be China which is characterised 
as an open economy with incomplete markets. Further on, we assume the following: 
 
1. In the home country, there is only one agent representing individuals living with an 
infinite horizon. The agent is the consumer as well as the producer. Time is discrete and 
indexed by 0,1,2,...t  . This sole agent can also be thought of as the central planner (in 
the form of the central banker) who acts on behalf of the economy. In the context of 
China, this assumption is reasonable since the Chinese government’s overwhelming 
orientation towards growth targeting has a dominant force driving consumption and 
production in the country.   
2. There is only one sector in the home country. In this sector only tradable goods are 
produced and consumed by the representative agent. Specifically, home-produced goods 
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are only for export, and the agent consumes only foreign-produced goods. Because all 
home-produced goods are for export, output or income is denominated in foreign assets, 
which can be either consumed or saved. Capital stock accumulation for producing output 
can be financed by savings in foreign assets, which can be used to smooth both 
consumption and capital stocks.  
3. The representative agent suffers from severe borrowing constraints due to incomplete 
financial markets. As a result, savings in foreign assets are constrained to be non-negative. 
4. The central banker consistently takes steady growth as her main policy object, and sets a 
target growth rate for the GDP. She also has cognitive biases toward growth, i.e. she is 
loss averse towards the target GDP growth rate and frames the uncertainty about growth 
narrowly, i.e. she evaluates this uncertainty by isolating it from consumption or total 
wealth. 
5. Markets are incomplete, so that the number of Arrow–Debreu securities is less than the 
number of states of nature. This shortage of securities restricts the agent from transferring 
the desired level of wealth among states and so the central bank will fully bear the risks 
of growth contraction. It then accumulates foreign assets as a precautionary measure to 
provide self-insurance against adverse shocks to growth. 
 
3.3. The Behavioural Model of Optimal Reserves 
3.3.1. The approach of BHS (2001) 
The model developed by Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) provides a general preference 
structure in which the representative agent derives utility from two sources. One is the utility in 
the conventional sense, i.e. the future utility her current wealth will bring from making the 
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consumption decision. The other is related to possible fluctuations of the value of her financial 
wealth in expectation, which is reflected in her objective function with an extra term. 
 
Inclusion of this additional source of utility allows the model to depart radically from the 
standard consumption-based approach to decision making. A notable property of this structure is 
its flexibility to take into account cognitive biases of agents who make decisions under 
uncertainty. Drawing on a central idea of the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
their model embeds the notion of loss aversion into decision making under risk, hence the utility 
over fluctuating financial wealth. In addition to loss aversion, it turns out that other well-
established ideas in the psychology literature can also be incorporated into the analysis, such as 
narrow framing (Barberis and Huang, 2009) and the house money effect as uncovered in Thaler 
and Johnson (1990). 
 
3.3.2. The preference specification 
In our model, the central banker as the representative agent in the home country chooses a 
consumption level tC  and allocates savings, i.e. t tM C , between the risk-free asset 1tA   and the 
capital stock 1tI   to maximise: 
1
1 1
0
( )
1
t t
t t t
t
C
E B H

  


 

 
 
 
       (1) 
In the preference specification (1), the first term in the parenthesis is CRRA utility over 
consumption tC . It is a standard feature of the agent’s preference in the consumption-based 
approach. The parameter  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which controls the 
curvature of utility over consumption. 
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The second term in the parenthesis of (1) represents utility from the agent’s cognitive biases, as a 
result of departing from the consumption-based approach. The parameter  is the time discount 
factor. The scaling factor 1tB   is given by: 
1 0 1 0 1'( )t t tB B u C B C

          (2) 
where 0 0B   indicates the coefficient of narrow framing (hereafter NF), which allows control of 
the overall importance of utility from the agent’s cognitive biases relative to utility from 
consumption. Narrow framing, first labelled by Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), and extended by 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2009), indicates that the agent 
evaluates a specific risk or uncertainty by isolating it from consumption or from the total wealth. 
If 0 0B  , the preference specification (1) is abbreviated to the consumption-based approach 
with standard utility, if no cognitive biases. 
 
The term 1'( )tu C   or 1tC

 , which is the first-order derivative of utility over consumption 1tC  , is 
introduced to ensure that standard utility and cognitive-biases utility are of the same order as 
aggregate resources increase over time. The term 1( )tH    implies that the agent derives utility 
from fluctuations of growth and is loss averse towards her GDP growth target, using the linear 
loss aversion function. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001, 2009) 
employ a similar setting to embed cognitive biases such as loss aversion function into their 
model to characterise the behaviour of the representative agent. 
 
3.3.3. Resources constraints 
20 
 
Under such a preference specification, the representative agent faces the initial given resources
tM , denominated by net foreign assets, available at the beginning of time t. After consumption 
decision tC  at the beginning of time t, the agent chooses how to allocate her saving, i.e. t tM C , 
between the risk-free asset 1tA   and the capital stock 1tI   for the output at the end of time t, i.e. at 
the beginning of time t+1: 
1 1t t t tM C A I          (3) 
Due to market incompleteness and inefficiency, the agent is constrained in borrowing, so that she 
has: 
1 0tA      or   1t t tM C I         (4) 
As the representative of the producer, the agent is assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with normalised-to-unity labour force: 
1 1t tY I

        (5) 
which is an endogenous transitory GDP growth process experienced by the agent, where the term 
 is the capital share to GDP and 0 1  .  
 
The agent also experiences a permanent GDP growth process: 
1 1t t tP G P        (6) 
where 1tP is permanent GDP growth and 1t
G   is the permanent GDP growth factor. For 
simplicity, we assume that 1t tP P  , i.e. 1 1tG   , with the consequence that we rule out 
permanent shocks to income and focus only on the impact of transitory shocks to GDP growth. 
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We normalise our problem divided by the level of permanent GDP 1tP  and use small letters to 
denote the normalised version of capital letters, such as /t t tm M P , /t t tc C P , and /t t ty Y P . 
Also, we make the assumption that such ratios are time-invariant. More detailed information on 
the derivation of the normalised problem can be found in Carroll (2011).   
Thus, that the agent faces stochastic transitory GDP growth is captured by adding transitory 
shocks 1t   to the Cobb-Douglas production function (5): 
1 1 1t t ty i
         (7) 
where 1t   is log-normally distributed transitory shocks, i.e.  2 21log ~ / 2,t       . This 
assumption about the distribution of  guarantees that log [ ] 0E   , which means [ ] 1E   (the 
mean value of the transitory shocks is 1). 
 
The transitory shocks 1t   as the only source of uncertainty to GDP growth indicate the 
uninsured aggregate shocks that reflect possible internal and/or external risks as described in 
Section 3.1. The risks threaten to cause recession and financial crisis and hence may lead to dire 
consequences for growth. The occurrence of the uninsurable aggregate shocks implies that the 
agent has to fully bear the GDP growth risks, due to the lack of state contingent claims. 
In the process of choosing how much savings to allocate between the risk-free asset 1ta   and the 
capital stock 1ti  , the agent faces the constraint of market resources 1tm   available at the 
beginning of time t+1 (or at the end of time t): 
1 1 1 1 1(1 )t f t t t tm R a i i
               (8) 
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where 1f fR r   is a worldwide risk-free rate factor. The first item on the RHS in equation (8) 
denotes the amount which earns the risk-free rate fr  after decisions of consumption and capital 
stock. The item 1 1t ti
    shows the transitory shocks to GDP from exports, and the item 1(1 ) ti   
implies the remaining amount of capital stock after production with a coefficient of capital 
depreciation . 
 
3.3.4. Loss aversion 
We embed a behavioural factor showing cognitive biases, i.e. the loss aversion pioneered by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), into the consumption-based model in the spirit of Barberis, 
Huang and Santos (2001). Carroll (1998) produces a model in which a consumer can obtain 
utility from the absolute level of wealth adjusted by consumption as well as from consumption, 
to interpret the phenomenon that rich people have higher lifetime saving rates because they 
regard the accumulation of wealth as power or social status. 
 
However, even though our representative agent maximises GDP growth, our model is only 
concerned with the fluctuations of the value of GDP or income around a reference point. 
Specifically, in our model setting, the central banker derives utility from consumption as well as 
from fluctuations of economic growth, but she is loss averse towards such fluctuations around a 
reference point.  
 
The reference point 1ty   set by the agent is her expectation of transitory GDP growth 1ty  . 
Recalling that [ ] 1E   , the reference point can therefore be shown as: 
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 1 1 1t t ty E y i

          (9) 
We then expound the loss-averse agent by a linear loss aversion piecewise function 1( )tH    with 
the help of Fortin and Hlouskova (2011): 
 
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) 1
0 1
t t t
t
t t t t t t
i
H for
i i i

  
 
 
   
  

     
 

 

   
      (10) 
where the term   is the degree of loss aversion with 1  . If the transitory shock is equal to or 
greater than 1, i.e. 1 1t   , the difference between stochastic transitory GDP growth 1ty   and its 
reference point 1ty   is equal to or greater than zero, i.e.  1 11 0t ti
    , indicating that the 
expected GDP growth is achieved or over-achieved, hence the utility function is the same as that 
in standard economics. If 10 1t   , the agent fails to achieve her expected GDP growth and 
therefore is loss averse, which implies that the resulted utility function is to add the standard one 
into  times the difference between 1ty   and 1ty  . 
 
3.3.5. Euler equations 
In the preference specification (1), the first term in the parenthesis, i.e. CRRA utility over 
consumption tC , can be written in the form of Bellman’s equation: 
 
1 0
1
{ , }
( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t t t t
c i
V m Max u c EV m


        (11) 
subject to 
1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 )t f t t t t t tm R m c i i i
                 (12) 
In each period, the agent must make two decisions. One is about consumption and the other is 
how to allocate her saving ( t tm c ) between the risk-free asset 1ta   and the capital stock 1ti  . 
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Thus, we now move to derive the first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to both consumption 
and capital stock. 
 
In standard economics, the FOCs with respect to both consumption and capital stock are derived 
using the envelope theorem 
 1'( ) '( )t f t tu c R E u c        (13) 
and 
 1 1'( ) '( )t t t tu c E u c          (14) 
respectively, where 
1
1 1 1 (1 )t t ti
       , which is the stochastic return on investing capital 
stock in GDP growth. Equations (13) and (14) are the typical Euler equations under stochastic 
GDP growth in the conventional literature. 
 
However, in the context of our model, the central banker has cognitive biases only towards the 
transitory shock 1t  , i.e. the uncertainty about GDP growth. Thus, for the loss-averse agent who 
frames the uncertainty narrowly, the FOCs to consumption and capital stock are 
 1'( ) '( )t f t tu c R E u c        (15) 
and 
   1 1 0 1 1'( ) '( ) '( ) ( )t t t t t t tu c E u c B E u c H              (16) 
respectively. The second term on the RHS of equation (16) shows the cognitive biases. If 0 0B  , 
equation (16) is reduced to equation (14). Equations (15) and (16) are the behavioural Euler 
equations with the stochastic GDP growth from the standard literature being combined with loss 
aversion and narrow framing. 
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If the agent faces deterministic GDP growth, i.e. 1  , cognitive biases disappear, i.e. 0 0B  , 
due to the absence of uncertainty. Thus, the FOCs with respect to consumption and to capital 
stock become: 
 1'( ) '( )t f t tu c R E u c        (17) 
and 
   11 1'( ) (1 ) '( )t t t tu c i E u c            (18) 
respectively. The term  11 (1 )ti     is the deterministic return on investing capital stock in 
GDP growth. 
 
3.3.6. Precautionary savings motive 
Precautionary savings can be defined as the extra amount of reserves accumulated by the central 
bank under uncertainty over the amount accumulated under certainty (Carroll and Kimball, 
2008). In conventional economics, precautionary savings are the extra amount of reserves under 
Euler equation (14) as against the amount under Euler equation (18). If the agent has cognitive 
biases, precautionary savings can be taken as the extra amount of reserves under Euler equation 
(16) compared to the amount under Euler equation (18). 
 
4. Numerical Solution 
4.1. Solving Numerically for Policy Functions 
It is difficult to find a closed form solution using analytical methods, so we resort to numerical 
method to derive the equilibrium reserve level and the dynamics of the reserve accumulation 
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process. This section describes the procedure of numerical solution for the policy functions of 
the representative agent. The solving algorithm involves dynamic programming, which defines 
the information about the current situation needed to make a correct decision as the state and the 
variables chosen at any given state in time are the control variables. By finding a rule that tells 
what the control variables should be, given possible values of the state, one derives the optimal 
plan or the policy function. In other words, a policy function is a rule that determines the control 
variables as a function of the state. 
To help clarify the procedure, we redefine: 
1t t tm c s         (19) 
and 
1 1 1t t ts a i          (20) 
Because the expectation of the Euler equations will depend not only on how much the agent 
saves, i.e. 1ts  , but also on how those savings are allocated between the risk-free asset 1ta   and 
capital stock 1ti   with stochastic returns, there are two control variables: tc  and 1ti  . The 
resources tm  are the state variable. The expectation must be defined as a function of the choice 
of both variables. 
 
Thus, our problem involves two control variables simultaneously, as is implied by the two first 
order conditions with regard to consumption and to capital stock under uncertainty. Equations 
(13) and (15) indicate that both standard economics and behavioural economics have the same 
first order condition (FOC) with regard to consumption, while they have different FOCs to 
capital stock. Combining equations (13) and (14), the FOC to capital stock in standard 
economics can be rewritten as 
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   1 1 1'( ) '( )f t t t t tR E u c E u c            (21) 
Incorporating equations (15) and (16), the FOC to capital stock in behavioural economics can be 
written as 
     1 1 1 0 1 1'( ) '( ) '( ) ( )f t t t t t t t tR E u c E u c B E u c H                (22) 
Hence, in standard economics, the two FOCs are (13) and (21) respectively, while in behavioural 
economics, the two FOCs are (15) and (22). 
 
We can solve this multidimensional optimisation problem by transforming it into a sequence of 
two simple optimisation problems. First, we evaluate the two optimal levels of asset allocation 
given the defined grid vector of total savings 1ts   on the basis of two different scenarios, i.e. 
equations (21) and (22), respectively. Second, we approximate the respective consumption 
decisions, i.e. consumption functions based on these two optimal levels of asset allocation given 
the same grid vector of 1ts  . 
 
Rearranging equations (21) and (22) respectively, we obtain the conditions for optimal asset 
allocation: 
     1 1'( ) 0f t t t tR E E u c        (23) 
and 
     1 0 1 1( ) '( ) 0f t t t t tR E B H E u c         (24) 
After defining a grid vector for the total amount of savings, 1 1 1t t ts a i    , we use a numerical 
root-finder to satisfy these two conditions of asset allocation as in equations (23) and (24), in 
order that: 
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    * 11 1 1(1 ) '( ) 0f t t t t tR E i E u c               (25) 
and 
     * 1 *1 1 0 1 1(1 ) ( ) '( ) 0f t t t t t tR E i B H E u c               (26) 
respectively. In terms of equations (25) and (26), we can solve for the two pairs of the optimal 
level of capital stock 
*
1ti   and risk-free asset
*
1ta   respectively, given the chosen grid vector for the 
end of period total amount of savings 1ts  . 
 
Second, with these two pairs of the optimal level of capital stock *i  and the risk-free asset *a  for 
the corresponding two conditions of asset allocation in hand, rearranging the first order 
conditions to consumption (13) and (15), we obtain: 
    
1/
* * *
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) (1 )t t f t t f t t t t tc m R E c R s i i i

  


     
     
  
      (27) 
where 1t t tm c s   . 
 
Based on equation (27), the policy function of consumption can be solved by backward iteration 
until convergence, using the Method of Endogenous Grid-points pioneered by Carroll (2006). 
We initialise the consumption function of the representative agent at a hypothetical last period in 
which all the available resources are consumed. Given the defined grid-points of end of period 
savings 1 0ts    (the non-negative savings resulting from the borrowing constraints), using the 
budget constraints it is straightforward to compute the endogenous grid-points of resources tm , 
i.e. 1t t tm c s   , consistent with each considered combination of consumption tc  and end of 
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period savings 1ts  . By linearly interpolating the pairs  ,t tm c , we can evaluate the consumption 
function of the second to last period. Then, we follow the same step for the representative agent 
to interpolate the consumption function until its convergence. 
 
4.2. The Baseline Calibration 
Having analytically explored the determination of reserve accumulation, and in particular the 
influence of cognitive biases of the decision maker, the model is calibrated to empirically assess 
the effects of the determinants and the extent to which the behavioural factors affect the 
dynamics of reserve build-up in China. The calibration results provide the basis for us to estimate 
the optimal foreign reserve accumulation for China that is in alignment with fundamentals and 
take into consideration the behavioural influence in decision making under uncertainty. 
Parameter values in the baseline calibration are chosen based on standard literature such as 
Carroll and Jeanne (2009) and Valencia (2010).  The benchmark calibration will be subject to 
sensitivity tests later. Table 1 reports the baseline values. 
  
<Table 1 about here> 
We use the conventional CRRA utility function 
 
1
( )
1
t
t
C
u C





 , with 2  . The discount factor 
is set at 0.94 and the world risk-free rate factor is set at 1.04, to guarantee the impatience 
condition 1fR   . We set the capital share in the production function to be equal to 0.2 and the 
depreciation rate of capital at 0.1. The degree of loss aversion is set to 2.25, as is typical in the 
behavioural literature. The effect of narrow framing is set to be 2NF   for the baseline 
coefficient, implying that the central banker believes that it is twice more important for her to 
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derive utility from GDP growth fluctuations than from consumption. Finally, we show transitory 
shocks by creating two sequences, i.e. both the values of transitory shocks denoted by vγ  and the 
probabilities of transitory shocks denoted by probγ  to meet [ ] 1E   . 
 
The numerical solution of the model boils down to finding a time-invariant policy function of 
consumption as the level of resources ( )t tc m that determines the representative agent’s 
consumption decision. The baseline consumption functions under both conventional economics 
and behavioural economics are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
In Figure 4, the horizontal axis shows the level of resources tm , and the vertical axis shows the 
level of consumption tc . The dash line is the 45-degree line, implying the borrowing constraint 
c m . The thin solid line depicts the baseline optimal consumption rule with the conventional 
rational agent under uncertainty. The thick solid line shows the baseline optimal consumption 
function under transitory shocks with behavioural economics in which the agent has cognitive 
biases on GDP growth fluctuations, i.e. the agent are influenced by both loss aversion and 
narrow framing ( 2)NF  . At each level of resources tm , the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) under uncertainty by the agent who is cognitively biased is lower than that under 
conventional uncertainty. The gap between the two demonstrates that precautionary saving 
motive is strengthened when incorporating loss aversion and narrow framing into the model. 
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4.3. Optimal Accumulation of Reserves and Sensitivity Analysis 
The calibration results can be interpreted further in the light of the buffer-stock saving behaviour 
described by Carroll (2011), which sheds light on the determination of optimal accumulation of 
reserves. According to Carroll (2011), the agent holds assets, i.e. savings, mainly to buffer 
unpredictable fluctuations of income and therefore to shield her consumption. When facing 
important income uncertainty the buffer-stock saving behaviour can arise, whereby the agent is 
both impatient, having desire to spend down her assets or to borrow against future income to 
finance current consumption, and prudent, which means that, à la Kimball (1990), the agent has 
a precautionary saving motive. Under plausible situations, the tension between her impatient 
desire to spend down assets and her prudent reluctance to draw down assets too far implies the 
existence of a target level of wealth (in our context, a target level of reserves). If the actual 
wealth is below the target level, fear (prudence) will be stronger than impatience and the agent 
will try to save, while if the actual wealth is above the target level, impatience will dominate 
over prudence and the agent will reduce her wealth. 
 
Following this exposition, we first derive the target level of resources tm , based on which we 
derive the target level of the corresponding risk-free asset ta  as the proxy for the optimal level of 
reserves. Because of the assumption of one sector in the economy, the amount of imports can be 
viewed as a proxy for the consumption level. This implies that we can obtain the optimal 
reserves/imports ratio by dividing the optimal level of reserves by the long-run consumption 
level. Furthermore, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the observed imports-to GDP ratio, in 
order to obtain the ratio of the long-run consumption to GDP. Finally, the optimal reserves to 
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GDP can be derived by multiplying the optimal reserves/imports ratio by the long-run 
consumption/GDP ratio. 
 
Following this process, the model calibration results suggest that the baseline optimal ratio of 
reserves to GDP for the rational agent is 15.46% under standard uncertainty; while, for the agent 
with cognitive biases, the optimal level of foreign reserves is much higher, reaching 52.40% of 
GDP when 2NF  . 
 
To check the robustness of our model in various plausible scenarios, we conduct sensitivity 
analyses to examine how the optimal level of reserves changes when parameters change. For 
simplicity, we report results given variations in the coefficients on narrow framing and the 
discount factor. The former determines the overall importance of the agent deriving utility from 
fluctuations of GDP growth, rather than from consumption. The discount factor determines the 
impatience attribute of the agent. Table 2 below indicates the resulting optimal ratio of reserves 
to GDP under different values of the two parameters. 
 
<Table 2 about here>  
 
The sensitivity analysis generates sizable variation in the optimal level of reserves. Scaled by 
GDP, the reserves to GDP ratio varies with changes in the two parameters. For each level of the 
discount rate, the behavioural factors such as loss aversion and narrow framing consistently bring 
about optimal reserve levels that are considerably higher than that for the conventional rational 
agent under uncertainty. It is intuitive that the more the central banker cares about GDP growth, 
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the more she needs reserve assets as a precautionary motive to provide self-insurance against 
income risk, due to market incompleteness. 
 
5. Conclusions 
That China should have persistently accumulated ever larger foreign reserves is perplexing. This 
paper develops a behavioural model of optimal reserve accumulation to decode the puzzling 
development. Existing literature has not been very successful in providing a satisfactory 
explanation for the observed massive build-up of foreign reserves in the emerging world, 
particularly China. Departing from the conventional reserve literature that relies on rationality of 
agents, our approach is centred on the agent who is cognitively biased when making decisions 
under uncertainty. Influences of both loss aversion and narrow framing are embedded into the 
model of precautionary saving as the main motive for accumulating seemingly large reserves. 
  
Benchmark calibration of the model indicates that taking into consideration agents’ cognitive 
biases is critically important to achieve a better understanding of the stance on international 
reserves in China. We show that the precautionary motive for reserve accumulation is 
strengthened when the agent is loss averse and has the trait of narrow framing. In all possible 
scenarios under examination within the model framework, the levels of precautionary reserves 
are higher for the agent with these cognitive biases than the one without. According to our model, 
the actual holdings of foreign reserves by China are broadly in line with the optimal level of 
precautionary reserves predicted by the behavioural model. The model thus complements the 
current literature by providing a plausible explanation for the Chinese puzzle of reserve 
accumulation.  The analysis highlights the prudent nature of the Chinese approach to foreign 
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reserve policy, under which the rapid accumulation of massive reserves is an equilibrium 
response by the Chinese central bank under influence of behavioural biases towards risk and 
losses.  
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Table 1 The Baseline Calibration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter description Parameter label Baseline value
Inter-temporal discount factor β 0.94
The coefficient of risk aversion ρ 2
World interest rate Rf 1.04
Capital share of production function α 0.2
Depreciation rate δ 0.1
The degree of loss aversion λ 2.25
The coefficient of narrow framing NF 2
The values of transitory shocks γv {0.9, 1, 1.1}
The probabilities of transitory shocks γprob {0.25, 0.5, 0.25}
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Table 2  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty NF=1 NF=2 NF=5
Beta=0.92 6.59% 19.26% 34.49% 61.21%
Beta=0.94 15.46% 30.28% 52.40% 90.87%
Beta=0.96 102% 138% 238% 619%
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Figure 1 Net Reserves/GDP Ratio 
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Figure 2  Total Reserves/GDP Ratio 
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Figure 3 GDP Growth and Private Consumption in China 
Note: The upper line: GDP   and the filled line: Consumption 
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Figure 4  Consumption Functions under Uncertainty vs. LA with NF=2 
 
 
